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Abstract
I study intermediation in networked markets using a stochastic
model of multilateral bargaining in which traders compete on diﬀerent
routes through the network. I characterize stationary equilibrium pay-
oﬀs as the ﬁxed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and
study eﬃciency and the impact of network structure on payoﬀs. There
is never too little trade but there may be an ineﬃciency through too
much trade in states where delay would be eﬃcient. With homogenous
trade surplus the payoﬀs for players that are not essential to a trade
opportunity go to zero as trade frictions vanish.
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This paper studies a network model of intermediation. Intermediation
activity occurs wherever economic actors do not trade directly but engage in-
directly involving one more intermediaries. There are many important mar-
kets where such activity is prevalent. They include over-the-counter ﬁnancial
markets, international trade, consumer goods markets involving wholesalers
and retailers as well as a number of markets involving dedicated brokers in-
cluding for example the real-estate and insurance industry. The phenomenon
raises a number of questions including: why intermediation arises in the ﬁrst
place; which traders become intermediaries; whether intermediation is eﬃ-
cient; and what the costs and beneﬁts of intermediation are for the traders
involved.
In this paper I explore these questions using a network approach. The
network perspective, which puts the structure of connections between trad-
ing parties at the heart of the analysis, is particularly appropriate for the
study of markets in which existing relationships matter for the interaction of
economic agents. Many settings can be usefully thought of as networked mar-
kets, including markets explicitly relying on transport networks (pipelines,
rail networks, ports) as well as markets where the connections are less tan-
gible. This includes for example relationships requiring trust, a history of
previous interaction or having suﬃcient information about trading partners.
Intermediation arises naturally in such markets whenever there are opportu-
nities for trade involving two parties that do not have a direct relationship,
preventing them from direct interaction. They may then nonetheless exploit
their trade opportunities by engaging indirectly, involving one or more inter-
mediaries that provide the necessary chain of relationships that makes the
trade feasible.
One prominent example market where connections, relationships and in-
termediation feature prominently are over-the-counter (OTC) ﬁnancial mar-
kets. In these markets assets are traded not on centralized, anonymous ex-
changes but instead directly between parties that are known to each other.
Recent years have seen a signiﬁcant increase in such oﬀ-exchange trading.
The Bank of International Settlements reports the total amount of OTC
derivative contracts outstanding increasing from about US$ 80,000bn at the
end of 1998 to over US$ 600,000bn at the end of 2010, with a peak of US$
673,000bn in June 2008.1 Such markets also often involves brokers and mar-
ket makers that provide intermediation services for actors that do not trade
directly with each other. These services are particularly important for prod-
ucts that are non-standard and highly complex.
From the network perspective, such instances are examples in which re-
lationships with an intermediary may allow the trading parties to engage in
a trade that otherwise would be infeasible as there is not direct relationship
between them. Reasons for the importance of relationships in these ﬁnancial
1Source: BIS Quarterly Review, September 2011
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markets abound: they allow banks and ﬁrms to manage their counterparty
risk exposure; there may be reputational concerns or trust issues; collat-
eral provisions may need to be in place; or parties may simply not know
enough about each other to engage directly without signiﬁcant investment
into search to identify trade opportunities or ﬁnding a suitable counterparty,
especially for more specialized asset classes.
In this paper I employ a modelling approach that explicitly incorporates
such a network perspective on intermediation activity. The approach brings
into focus the role and value of relationships used by third parties to facilitate
transactions between players that otherwise might lack the opportunity to
conduct trade directly. Speciﬁcally, I present a dynamic model of multilat-
eral bargaining and exchange in a network setting with intermediation. Each
period, a random matching process selects a route, that is, a group of players
connecting two trading parties via connecting intermediaries in the network.
One  also randomly selected  player on the route can make a proposal to
the other players. If it is accepted, the trade is implemented. If at least one
player on the route rejects, a new route and proposer are drawn. I show that
the model has a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in which payoﬀs
are characterized through an intuitive set of linear equations and use this to
study eﬃciency and the sharing of surplus between parties. The equilibrium
payoﬀs illustrate the eﬀect that competition between intermediation routes
has on the payoﬀs traders can expect. Eﬃciency considerations come into
play when diﬀerent routes may oﬀer diﬀerent levels of surplus. The question
is then to ﬁnd the correct routes to trade on. I show that whilst in the equi-
librium outcome players never unduly delay trade, there can exist instances
where players agree to trade prematurely, i.e. at times when delay would be
eﬃcient. The ineﬃciency arises from the strategic advantage for players that
can trade across multiple. They can increase payoﬀs relative to those who
are in competition with each other. Players thus have an incentive to keep
in play multiple routes, even if not all of them are eﬃcient for trade. The
same reasoning also suggests that traders in these markets have an incentive
to (over)invest in creating competing routes.
That markets for ﬁnancial assets may be thought of as networks is startlingly
exposed by looking at the data on trades in such markets. Early work in this
direction includes Upper and Worms (2004) and Craig and Von Peter (2014)
who analyze the German interbank market. Their data reveal a network in
a core-periphery structure with many peripheral banks that do not trade
directly with others but only through the well-connected intermediaries at
the center of the network. The model in this paper can be usefully seen to
capture a market with such a core-periphery conﬁguration: The seller in the
model represents a bank in the periphery trying to access another periphery
bank acting as the buyer. As no direct connections exist between banks
in the periphery, intermediaries from the core of the network are required
to facilitate the trade. The model then oﬀers useful predictions concerning
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the trade pattern across the network as well as incentives for the banks to
position themselves in the network.
I study a model with a single trade opportunity speciﬁc to a given seller,
reﬂecting the notion of a thin market. Once trade concludes, the game is over
and there is no replacement. This assumption approximates trade in highly
individualized products such as the complex ﬁnancial securities commonly
traded in OTC markets. This is in contrast to markets of more generic
assets such as commodities or standard ﬁnancial products where there may
be many buyers and sellers in the market at the same time.2
Note also that whilst I refer to buyers and sellers throughout the pa-
per, the model may usefully be applied to study other value adding interac-
tions between two parties, such as liquidity provision between banks, R &
D cooperation between ﬁrms, the formation of joint companies by multiple
entrepreneurs, coalition formation in political economy settings, etc.
The paper is structured as follows. The next Section 1 provides the
literature context for the research questions investigated. Section 2 sets out
the model and Section 3 provides an analysis as well as the key results of the
paper concerning eﬃciency and the relationship between structural features
and payoﬀs. Section 6 concludes.
1 Literature Context
This paper presents a contribution to the fast-growing literature on trade in
networks and in particular the analysis of intermediation in such networks.
The provision of intermediation services and middlemen activities which
this paper investigates in a network setting has been investigated in other
non-structural frameworks by several authors, with overviews provided in
Bose (2001) and Spulber (1999). Intermediaries have been credited with a
number of diﬀerent functions, including the provision of immediacy (Dem-
setz, 1968) or acting as a screening device between diﬀerent types of traders
that might be prevented from engaging directly with each other as in Bose
and Pingle (1995) or Brusco and Jackson (1999). In the latter, an interme-
diary arises endogenously to overcome ineﬃciencies in trade across competi-
tive markets. A seminal paper in this literature is Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987). They investigate a setting with three types of players: buyers, sell-
ers and middlemen. Trade is conducted on the basis of stochastic pairwise
matching and a steady state equilibrium is derived.3 A key insight of that
paper is that the outcome of trade and the terms of trade depend on whether
2The labels of buyers and sellers can be reversed without consequence for further anal-
ysis. The key simpliﬁcation of the model is that there is just one trade opportunity and
one node is involved in a possible coalitions that can realize the opportunity.
3In steady state equilibrium the outﬂow of pairs of traders which conclude a trade is
exactly balanced by an exogenously given inﬂows of players.
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the middleman takes ownership of the good from sellers or work on a consign-
ment basis. In the ﬁrst case, the market is biased in favor of buyers, whereas
in the second case symmetry between parties is restored. Duﬃe et al. (2005)
study a search and matching model for OTC markets. They analyze a model
in which trading opportunities arise endogenously and study amongst others
the implications of greater competition for intermediation services. As in
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), the model does not capture heterogeneity
in the connections that traders may have to the intermediaries and amongst
the intermediaries itself.
In contrast to the work cited above, structural features are at the core
of a fast-growing literature on exchange in networks with numerous recent
contributions. Seminal early works in this ﬁeld include Corominas-Bosch
(2004) on bargaining in networks and the exchange model in Kranton and
Minehart (2001). Both adopt a bipartite networks approach, precluding
an analysis of intermediation. More recent contributions in this direction
include Manea (2011), Elliott (2011), Polanski (2007) and Polanski and Vega-
Redondo (2013). Models which allow for multiple steps in trading come in
two distinct ﬂavors. Gale and Kariv (2007), Manea (2013) and Gofman
(2011) all consider a trading protocol in which the good travels from seller
to buyer in a step-wise fashion, with traders interacting bilaterally at each
step. The paper by Nava (2013), which studies quantity competition instead
of an explicit bargaining setting, arguably also falls into this category as
intermediaries beneﬁt from double marginalization.
In contrast Blume et al. (2009), Polanski and Lazarova (2011) and Nguyen
(2012) allow for simultaneous multilateral interaction, which is also the ap-
proach I adopt in this paper. The key distinction of the current work is that
contrary to Blume et al. (2009) I consider an explicit bargaining protocol
whereas they consider price setting intermediaries (which they call traders).
Furthermore, contrary to Nguyen (2012) and Polanski and Lazarova (2011)
I focus on a setting without replacement, that is, an environment where par-
ties that conclude a trade are not replaced by replica players. My model is
therefore more suitable to study markets where trade opportunities are just
that: opportunities that ought to be taken and carry an opportunity cost via
the risk of missing out as players cannot expect to get the same opportunity
again.4 The model thus oﬀers a better match for real world markets where
trade opportunities are not limitless, which arguably is the case in many
relationship based markets, including for ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets
as well interactions in which players collaborate to conduct a joint project,
e.g. an R & D joint venture. The assumption of no replacement has sig-
niﬁcant implications on equilibrium predictions. For example competition
between multiple intermediaries is signiﬁcantly tougher than in model with
4Even if a new opportunity were to arise, the opportunity cost applies as long as players
are not prevented from taking part in more than a single rate.
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replacement. I will say more on this point later.
The literature on ﬁnancial networks employs network tools to analyze
various aspects of ﬁnancial markets, including risk sharing and contagion
amongst ﬁnancial institutions. An overview is provided in Allen and Babus
(2009). Babus (2012) provides a network perspective to OTC trading and
investigates the incentives for ﬁnancial institutions seeking to exchange assets
to form relationships. In her model, links describe relationships which allow
banks to use repeated interactions instead of costly collateral to implement
and enforce exchange agreements.
Finally, at a technical level, this paper employs the framework of stochas-
tic bargaining games with perfect information analyzed in detail in Merlo and
Wilson (1995, 1998) and extends it for use in analyzing games on networks.
One contribution of my paper to this literature is to identify a new source
of ineﬃciency in such stochastic bargaining settings, which does not arise in
the setting of Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) as their model does not allow
for the set of players bargaining changing each period. These changes are
crucial in the network setting I study as they correspond to diﬀerent routes
and also introduce the notion of players being excluded from the bargaining
table.
2 Model
This section presents a model in which players bargain over a surplus, gen-
erated e.g. through exchange, on a network. We consider a setting in which
a network of relationships describes the possibilities for players to interact.
Players have access to an opportunity that generates surplus, e.g. an asset
trade between a buyer and a seller. Players are matched along the network
of existing relationships and bargain over the allocation of the available sur-
plus within groups that form feasible trade routes. The bargaining protocol
allows for the random selection of trade routes as well as the identity of pro-
poser, incorporating the notion of competition between diﬀerent alternative
trade routes.
The model I present here includes a number of stark simplifying assump-
tions, e.g. concerning the underlying matching and bargaining protocol.
These have been imposed in order to make the exposition as clean and trans-
parent as possible. The same general insights would remain valid under less
restrictive assumptions on many elements of the model.
Players Players are denoted by the set N = {1, 2, ..., n}. There is one player
A ∈ N  the seller  who holds a single, indivisible good that she can
sell to each of a set of m buyers B = {B1, B2, . . . Bm} and Bi 6= a.
Network Players interact according to an undirected network denoted by
g = (N,E) where the set of edges E ⊂ {(i, j) : i 6= j ∈ N} describes
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the set of feasible bilateral interactions. A group of players can trade
with each other if and only if there exists a path in g between them.
As will be described in greater detail below, trade between two nodes
that are only indirectly connected is feasible through intermediaries if
there exists at least one path between them. I assume that the network
is connected.5
Routes A path R ⊆ N between a pair of nodes i and j is a sequence of
nodes (i1, i2, i3, . . . , iK−1, iK) with (ik, ik+1) ∈ E ∀ k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
i1 = i, iK = j and each node in the sequence distinct. A path is
therefore acyclic. As the network is connected there exists at least one
path in the network g between each buyer/seller pair. We call such an
acyclic path connecting A and a given buyer Bi a route. Each route Rj
has a surplus vj attached to it reﬂecting buyer valuation less any costs.
Depending on the network g for each given buyer-seller pair there may
be multiple routes.6
Matching and bargaining protocol The model operates in discrete time.
In each period, traders are matched and bargain under a stochastic
route selection and bargaining protocol building on Merlo and Wilson
(1995) as follows.
Each period one trade route is activated and an order of play for players
on this route is randomly determined. Based on this draw, players that
are on the route bargain according to the order prescribed within the
state, with the ﬁrst acting as proposer.
Formally, in each period a state s from ﬁnite state space S is selected by
a Markov process σ = (σ0, σ1, σ2, . . .). A state s contains information
about three elements of the model:
i. The active buyer B(s) ∈ B.
ii. The route R(s) ⊆ N connecting the pair of players who have the
trade opportunity with associated valuation v(s), representing the
surplus available in state s if there is agreement.
iii. A permutation ρ(s) on R(s) which denotes the order in which
players move through the bargaining protocol. ρi(s) ∈ N denotes
the player moving in ith position. Following Merlo and Wilson
(1995) we denote by κ(s) ≡ ρ1(s) the ﬁrst mover in the order.
We take the set of states S to span all feasible trade routes in g as well as
for each route all permutations of players on that route. Furthermore,
5This assumption is without loss of generality here as disconnected players simply
cannot trade.
6One may restrict attention to shortest paths or geodesics only, but this restriction is
not essential for the analysis.
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to simplify the exposition I assume that σ is time homogeneous, such
that σt = σt′ ∀ t, t′ and each period's draw is independent of the
previous period's state. Finally, we assume each s ∈ S is drawn with
strictly positive probability. Thus, every route is selected and every
player is called upon as proposer with positive probability.7
On realization of state s, trader κ(s) may propose an allocation or
pass. If a proposal is made, this takes the form of a vector x ∈ Rn
such that xi ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈N xi ≤ v(s). x thus represents a split of
available surplus amongst all players, allocating a nonnegative share
xi of the good to each trader in N . The other traders on the route then
respond sequentially in order given by ρ(s) by accepting or rejecting
the proposal. This process continues until either (i) one player rejects
proposal x or (ii) all players in R(s) have accepted it.
If all responders accept x, the proposed split is implemented and the
game ends. If the proposer passes or at least one responder rejects the
proposed split, the bargaining round ends and the game moves to the
next period in which a new state s′ consisting of both a route R(s′)
and a new order of play ρ(s′) is drawn and the bargaining process is
repeated. This sequence is continued until an allocation is accepted by
all players.
Information Structure All players observe the realized states and all ac-
tions taken by other players.
Payoﬀs Payoﬀs are linear in the share of surplus allocated, with common
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). If proposal x is accepted in period t, player
i receives utility:
ui(x) = δ
txi
We assume that the surplus to be allocated is bounded above such that
ui(x)→ 0 as as agreement time t→∞.
The model forms an inﬁnite horizon dynamic game of complete infor-
mation. Players take a decision in two distinct roles: as proposer and as
responder. As proposer, a player either passes or suggests a split of sur-
plus on a given route conditional on the route selected and being selected as
proposer. As responder, players have to decide whether to accept or reject
a proposed surplus division. A responder's decision is conditioned on the
selected route and proposer as well as the surplus division on the table.
7The assumption of independence allows me to dispense with conditioning on the cur-
rent state whenever expectations about future realizations are formed and follows standard
random proposer bargaining games. However, a general Markov process would leave gen-
eral results unaﬀected as long as all states remain in play at all times.
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A history is deﬁned by a sequence of realized states and actions taken by
players. A strategy speciﬁes a feasible action at every possible history when
a player must act.
Note that bargaining in the model is multilateral and follows a unanimity
rule: the good remains with the seller unless agreement with all intermedi-
aries on the selected route to the buyer has been reached. Thus the model is
applicable to markets in which intermediators act as a broker rather than
ones in which they take possession of the good and act as a market-maker.8
Considerations which arise in market better described by a good traveling
along the route, such as questions of hold-up (intermediaries being in posses-
sion of but not intrinsically valuing the good) or counterparty risk associated
with disappearing resale opportunities, thus remain outside the model.9
3 Equilibrium Payoﬀs
This section develops the equilibrium analysis of the model. We restrict
attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE), that is, subgame
perfect equilibria consisting of strategies which condition on payoﬀ relevant
histories only: the state (selected route and order of proposals), and the oﬀer
on the table in the given period.
Stationary equilibrium payoﬀs are characterized as a ﬁxed point to an
intuitive set of recursive equations using results derived in Merlo and Wilson
(1998) and extending the analysis to the setting of networked markets. All
proofs in this as well as subsequent sections are collected in Appendix 7.
Let f be an expected payoﬀ where f(s) ∈ Rn denotes the vector of
expected payoﬀs for players in state s. Deﬁne an operator A on payoﬀ f
which maps from Rn·|S|+ to R
n·|S|
+ such that:
a. If v(s) > δ
∑
j∈R(s)E [fj(s
′)] (Agreement):
Ai(f)(s) =

v(s)− δE
[∑
j∈R(s)\i fj(s
′)
]
for Proposer i = κ(s)
δE [fi(s
′)] for Responder i ∈ R(s) \ κ(s)
0 for Excluded i /∈ R(s)
8Reporting of corporate bond markets suggests that in the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis brokers increasingly showed the behavior implied in the model: In the wake of
the ﬁnancial crisis and ahead of tighter regulatory constraints, large Wall Street dealers
have become far less willing to hold the risk of owning corporate bonds, known in market
parlance as `inventory,' in order to facilitate trading for their clients. Instead, they are
increasingly trying to match buyers and sellers, acting more as a pure intermediary, rather
than stockpiling bonds and encouraging a liquid market for secondary trading. Source:
Financial Times, November 8, 2011
9See the discussion in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) concerning the diﬀerence be-
tween middlemen taking ownership of the good and acting on consignment. Models ex-
ploring trade in networks in which the good travels on a bilateral basis from seller to buyer
are analyzed in Gofman (2011) and Condorelli and Galeotti (2012).
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b. If v(s) < δ
∑
j∈R(s)E [fj(s
′)] (Disagreement):
Ai(f)(s) = δE
[
fi(s
′)
] ∀ i ∈ N
c. If v(s) = δ
∑
j∈R(s)E [fj(s
′)] (Mixing):
Ai(f)(s) =
{
δE [fi(s
′)] ∀ i ∈ R(s)
φ(s)δE [fi(s
′)] with φ(s) ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i /∈ R(s)
where φ(s) is the probability of disagreement in state s.
The payoﬀ operator A(f) distinguishes three cases depending on v(s),
the surplus in state s. These can be interpreted as follows:
a. If the available surplus v(s) exceeds the total expected value of moving
to the next stage for players on the selected route (δE
[∑
j∈R(s)\i fj(s
′)
]
),
then A(f) assigns to the proposer a payoﬀ that extracts from responding
parties on the selected route all surplus over and above their endoge-
nously determined outside option value given by δE [f(s′)], leaving zero
to traders not included on the route.
b. If the available surplus v(s) is less than the expected value of moving to
the next stage for players on the selected route, then A(f) assigns that
payoﬀ to each player.
c. If the available surplus v(s) is equal to the expected value of moving to
the next stage for players on the selected route, A(f) for players on the
route is equal to their outside option. For excluded players the payoﬀ is
between zero and their outside option. Their exact payoﬀ is a share of
their outside option equal to the probability of disagreement in the state.
A stationary equilibrium payoﬀ of the bargaining game is a ﬁxed point
of this correspondence. The proof follows standard approaches and is in
Appendix 7.1.
Proposition 1. There exists an SSPE payoﬀ f . f is an SSPE payoﬀ if and
only if A(f) = f .
The equilibrium payoﬀ is supported by a strategy proﬁle in which every
players adopts a strategy with the following standard properties. When
responding a player accepts any oﬀer which gives her at least the discounted
expected next period payoﬀ and reject otherwise. If proposing, she oﬀers
every responder their outside option if the residual amount is strictly larger
than the proposer's discounted expected next period payoﬀ. If the residual is
strictly less, the proposer passes with probability one. In case of indiﬀerence
the proposer makes an oﬀer as above with probability between zero and one.
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We discuss the role of such mixed agreement states further below. Here it
suﬃces to note that the agreement probabilities may not be uniquely pinned
down for each state as diﬀerent combinations of agreement probabilities may
support the same vector of expected equilibrium payoﬀs.
Proposition 1 allows the analysis of equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs for
all possible trade networks and buyer valuations on the basis of a set of equa-
tions describing value functions in a recursive manner. We will exploit the
characterization to study eﬃciency and the impact of network structure on
equilibrium outcomes in subsequent sections. At this point it is worthwhile
to emphasize the implications of the no replacement assumption on equi-
librium payoﬀs. Proposition 1 implies that excluded players receive a zero
payoﬀ in states of agreement whilst they can have a positive expected payoﬀ
in states of disagreement. This reﬂects the fact that they may be included
in successful negotiations in a future period. The zero payoﬀ for excluded
players in case of agreement presents a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to models with
replacement (e.g. Nguyen (2012) and Polanski and Lazarova (2011)) in which
players that do not take part in a trade that is concluded simply wait for the
next period to be oﬀered an essentially unchanged environment opportunity.
It signiﬁcantly intensiﬁes the competition between diﬀerent trading routes
as they vie to be included in the group that reaches agreement. Section 5
provides further analysis on this topic.
4 Eﬃciency
This section discusses the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium of the bar-
gaining game. Eﬃciency is achieved by adopting an optimal stopping rule
which implements agreement in states which oﬀer suﬃciently high surplus
and delays otherwise. Let v∗ be the ex ante expected total surplus that
can be derived under the optimal stopping rule. Then by the principle of
optimality the eﬃcient agreement probability φ∗(s) in state s is
φ∗(s) =

1 if v(s) > δv∗
φ ∈ [0, 1] if v(s) = δv∗
0 if v(s) < δv∗
This eﬃciency benchmark suggests two possible sources of ineﬃciency:
there may be too much trade or too little. Too much trade is conducted
if the parties involved in bargaining on a route agree to an allocation in a
state in which it would be eﬃcient to wait. There is too little trade if the
parties do not agree on an allocation in a state where trade would be strictly
eﬃcient in the sense that available surplus strictly exceeds what could be
gained from waiting. As shown below, the equilibrium does not exhibit the
latter type of ineﬃciency but is subject to the ﬁrst.
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Proposition 2. In an SSPE players reach agreement with probability one
in all states in which agreement is strictly eﬃcient.
Proposition 2 implies a corollary for the baseline case where all feasible
routes generate the same surplus v. In this case, v∗ = v and thus eﬃciency
demands that trade be concluded immediately without delay.
Corollary 3. If v(s) = v ∀ s ∈ S, in an SSPE trade is conducted immedi-
ately and the equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient.
A necessary condition for delay in this model is thus the heterogeneity
of surplus across diﬀerent routes.
Proposition 2 also implies that trade is concluded even along interme-
diation routes which may involve relatively large numbers of intermediaries
when shorter, more direct routes are available. Thus, an intuitive prediction
that it might be better for buyer and seller to delay trade in such situations
to avoid splitting the surplus with additional parties does not hold. This is
due to the fact that equilibrium rents for intermediaries on the longer route
are endogenously lower, reﬂecting the constraint exerted by the presence of
the shorter route. Thus, in this model there is no strategic cost from ad-
ditional intermediaries per se. What matters for whether a route is actively
traded is the surplus it generates. This feature is an important implication
of the model which recently has received experimental support in Choi et al.
(2014).
Can trade occur too early in equilibrium? Yes, as long as δ < 1 as I will
illustrate in a simple example. Consider the setting with a single seller and
two possible routes, each with one intermediary and one buyer, illustrated
in Figure 1. The low valuation route generates a surplus of 1 whilst the high
valuation route generates a surplus of v ≥ 1. Assume a uniform stochastic
process such that each route is selected with probability 12 and along each
route each player is selected with equal probability. Thus, each route is
played half of the time and conditional on a route being selected each of the
three players is proposing with equal probability.
The eﬃcient outcome in this case involves either trade along both routes
or trade along the high value route with valuation v only, depending on
the discount factor δ. Speciﬁcally, comparing expected total payoﬀs we can
derive a critical discount factor of δ˜ = 21+v at which delay and agreement on
the low value route generate the same payoﬀ. For δ > δ˜ eﬃciency requires
trade to take place only along the high value route.
In contrast, the vector of equilibrium payoﬀs is such that agreement takes
place in low value states with positive probability for a range of δ > δ˜. To
see why consider payoﬀs in a hypothetical equilibrium in which indeed trade
took place with the low valuation buyer with probability zero. In this case,
E [fB1(s)] = E [fI1(s)] = 0 as this route would never be involved in trade
12
I1
A
B1
I2
v1 = 1 v2 = v ≥ 1
B2
Figure 1: Example with Two Distinct Intermediation Routes
agreement. For the players on the high value route (seller as well as the
buyer and intermediary) the payoﬀ equations would then be symmetric and
yield E [fA(s)] = E [fB1(s)] = E [fI1(s)] =
v
6−3δ . However, for δ < δ
∗ = 63+v
it would imply δE [fS(s)] < 1. The seller would have a proﬁtable deviation
to oﬀer some  > 0 to the low value traders (who would accept it). Thus
there is no stationary equilibrium in which trade occurs on the low value
route with zero probability.
Note that δ∗ > δ˜ and thus there is an interval of discount factors δ with
strictly positive measure in which equilibrium payoﬀs will be such that they
imply trade with positive probability with the low valuation buyer  despite
this being ineﬃcient. Indeed, what we observe as δ increases within [δ˜, δ∗] is
that the equilibrium involves mixed strategies such that trade occurs on the
low value route with a probability that is positive but strictly less than one.
We can interpret this equilibrium as the seller keeping the low value route in
play in order to maintain her strategic advantage relative to the high value
route.
Two following two ﬁgures summarize the workings of the example with
v = 4 by plotting equilibrium expected payoﬀs for all players (Figure 2),
the probability of agreement in low valuation states (Figure 3) and the total
surplus (Figure 4). The critical discount factor δ˜ above which trade on the
low value route become ineﬃcient is 25 in this case. As Figure 3 illustrates,
in equilibrium trade occurs with probability one for an interval above this
and then declines smoothly towards zero, hitting zero at 67 . In between these
two values, the expected total surplus realized in equilibrium is below the
eﬃcient one (Figure 4).
Two further points are worth noting about the expected payoﬀs of the
seller and the downstream players (buyer and intermediary). First, for δ > 67
we see the payoﬀs for the seller and the downstream traders on the high value
route overlapping, reﬂecting the strategic symmetry of the three players
whenever only the high value route is traded on. Second, for 25 < δ <
6
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the chart shows higher payoﬀs for the seller, which illustrates the strategic
asymmetry that results from the seller making active use of her outside
option of trading on the low value route.
0 0.4 0.735 0.857 1
d
1
Payoff
E@fD
A
I1,B1
I2,B2
Figure 2: Example  Expected Payoﬀs
0 0.4 0.735 0.857 1
d
1
Agreement
Probability
Figure 3: Example  Agreement Probability
The source of the too much trade ineﬃciency identiﬁed here is a hold-up
problem: from an eﬃciency perspective the seller should invest by delaying
in the low surplus state, accessing the surplus of higher expected valuation.
However, in the resulting conﬁguration the symmetry between the seller
and the high valuation buyer would result in equal payoﬀs for both players
which leaves the seller worse oﬀ. Eﬃciency could be restored were the high
valuation buyer able to commit to compensate the seller for the delay decision
by promising a higher share of the surplus in the high value states. However,
an SSPE does not permit strategies implementing such promises.
Looked at from another perspective, the ineﬃciency can be regarded as
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Figure 4: Example  Total Surplus
the result of the seller's privileged position and her unwillingness to give up
the payoﬀ beneﬁts that result from having alternative sources of supply. If
there were only a single buyer, then the trading outcome would be eﬃcient,
even if we hold constant at one half the probability of the high valuation
route being activated in each period. Thus the addition of a trade route,
a thickening of the market, can lead to a less eﬃcient outcome. Even
worse, the equilibrium payoﬀs are such that there are incentives for the seller
to create such connections to additional buyers, even if these have a lower
valuation and lead to a lower total surplus in equilibrium. The bargaining
model thus exhibits incentives for over-investment in connections.
Finally note that as δ → 1, the equilibrium outcome realigns with eﬃ-
ciency as trade takes place along routes other than highest value with prob-
ability zero. However, the incentives to overinvest by connecting to lower
valuation routes may remain in place as players still gain from creating a
strategic alternative for themselves and appropriating a larger share of the
surplus. If such alternatives have a cost  > 0 attached to them, such invest-
ment would be wasteful even if in equilibrium trade would occur only on the
eﬃcient route.
5 Network Structure and Equilibrium Payoﬀs
This section considers the relationship between structural features of the
trade network and equilibrium payoﬀs. One implication of Proposition 1 is
that players excluded in a state where agreement is struck receive a zero
payoﬀ. As a consequence, players that ﬁnd themselves in such situations
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Figure 5: A setting with k intermediaries
may be expected to have their bargaining power reduced. I investigate this
question ﬁrst by considering the way in which payoﬀs change as the number
of competing intermediaries increases before deriving a more general result
by considering the impact of being essential to a trade on payoﬀs. I restrict
attention in the following to a setting in which all routes generate the same
surplus in all states such that v(s) = 1 ∀ s to focus attention on the strategic
competition between otherwise comparable routes.
5.1 Additional Intermediation Routes
To investigate the impact the number of intermediaries has on payoﬀs, con-
sider ﬁrst a simple setting with a single buyer and a set of k intermediaries
that directly link to both the seller and the single buyer for the asset (see
Figure 5), each generating a surplus of 1. Expected equilibrium payoﬀs for
the end-nodes A and B and any intermediary Ii are then given by E[fA],
E[fB] and E[fIi ], respectively:
E[fA] = E[fB] =
k − δ
k (3− δ)− 2δ
E[fIi ] =
1− δ
k (3− δ)− 2δ
As expected, payoﬀs for end-nodes increase with the entry of additional
intermediaries. Also as δ → 1, payoﬀs for intermediaries go to zero. The
ratio of the payoﬀs is given by fBfI = 1 +
k−1
1−δ . At k = 1, the relative shares
are equal and as k increases the ratio increases linearly at rate 11−δ .
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5.2 Limit Payoﬀs on a Network with Competing Routes
The analysis in the previous section illustrates the impact of competition in
a simple setting with simple, competing intermediaries. One result of this
analysis is that as trade frictions vanish in the limit intermediaries receive an
expected payoﬀ of zero. This section shows how the intuition derived from
this simple example carries through to general structures.
Deﬁnition 1. A player i is essential to a trade opportunity if i ∈ R(s) ∀ s ∈
S.
The deﬁnition reﬂects the approach adopted in Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2007) applied to the present model. Structurally speaking, a player is es-
sential if he is located on all possible trade routes between the buyer and
the seller of the good. As such, non-essential traders are competing for the
business of intermediating the trade opportunity.
Proposition 4. In an SSPE of the game with equal surplus in all states,
the limit payoﬀ of trader i as δ → 1 is strictly greater than zero if and only
if the trader is essential.
Intuitively, the key distinction between essential and non-essential players
is that the latter have a positive probability of being excluded. This means
that in the limit their implicit discount factor remains strictly below one
whilst for essential players it converges to one.
Proposition 4 provides microfoundations for an analysis of competing in-
termediaries on networks and maps the intuitive Bertrand outcome into the
bargaining setting investigated here. As such it provides a justiﬁcation for
the payoﬀ structure used in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007), who investi-
gate incentives for network formation in a setting with intermediation rents.
Whilst they assume that non-essential players receive zero payoﬀ, justifying
it as the kernel and core in a cooperative bargaining setup, the present anal-
ysis may provide some grounding for this assumption in a non-cooperative
bargaining setting.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study a model of bargaining and exchange with intermedi-
ation on networks, extending the Merlo and Wilson (1995) framework as a
tool to analyze stochastic bargaining games into a network setting. I char-
acterize payoﬀs with a simple set of value function equations allowing the
analysis of eﬃciency and the impact of structure on payoﬀs in equilibrium
outcomes. I ﬁnd that trade in settings with homogeneous valuations across
all routes, trade is eﬃcient. However, with heterogeneity of surplus across
routes, there can be too much trade in the shape of ineﬃciently early agree-
ment in equilibrium, arising from a potential hold-up problem. Competition
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between intermediaries is shown to reduce payoﬀs for this type of player. In
the limit as bargaining frictions disappear, all players that are not essential
to a trade opportunity receive equilibrium payoﬀs of zero. I have imposed
a number of simplifying assumptions to oﬀer a clean and transparent expo-
sition of the eﬀects in my model. The same insights would remain if the
model were generalized in a number of possible directions, including a more
general stochastic process of selecting routes and proposers.
The present analysis suggests there is scope for future research in a num-
ber of interesting directions. These include in particular a more explicit study
of the implications of the bargaining model for network formation identifying
the incentives for players to invest in connections. The resulting predictions
can then be compared to those in models with diﬀerent payoﬀs structures
including for example Babus (2012) and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Characterization
This section presents the proof of Proposition 1. The approach taken employs
a standard argument adapted from Merlo and Wilson (1998). The proof of
the proposition requires demonstrating that f is an SSPE payoﬀ if and only
if A(f) = f .
Proof. ⇒ f is an SSPE payoﬀ implies A(f) = f 
Consider an SSPE payoﬀ f and ﬁx a state s with i = κ(s). Given f ,
it is a best reply for responder j to a given proposal x to reject if xj <
δE [fj(s
′)] and to accept if xj > δE [fj(s′)]. This implies that i can earn
v(s)− δE
[∑
j∈R(s),j 6=i fj(s
′)
]
from making a proposal that is accepted and
E [fi(s
′)] from passing. Thus, if v(s) < δE
[∑
j∈R(s) fj(s
′)
]
, the proposer will
pass in a SSPE and fi(s) = δE [f(s
′)] ∀ i. If v(s) > δE
[∑
j∈R(s) fj(s
′)
]
, i
will make a proposal in an SSPE that is accepted, earning:
v(s)− δE
 ∑
j∈R(s),j 6=i
fj(s
′)
 for i
δE
[
fj(s
′)
]
for j ∈ R(s) \ i
0 for k /∈ R(s)
If v(s) = δE
[∑
j∈R(s) fj(s
′)
]
, the proposer is indiﬀerent with f(s) = δE [f(s′)]
again. This implies that in an SSPE an agreement can be reached with any
probability between zero and one, which implies payoﬀs for any excluded
player k that are in [0, δE [fk(s
′)]]. Thus A(f) = f .
⇐ A(f) = f  implies f is an SSPE payoﬀ
Assume A(f) = f . We show that f is an SSPE payoﬀ by deﬁning a
suitable strategy proﬁle and demonstrating that no player can be better oﬀ
by unilaterally deviating. The strategy proﬁle instructs proposers to pass
unless v(s) < δE
[∑
j∈R(s) fj(s
′)
]
in which case the proposer oﬀers each
responder j the [fj(s
′)]. Responders will then accept, which yields δE [fi(s′)].
Now, given payoﬀs f there is no incentive for any j ∈ R(s) \ i to deviate and
reject. For player i, there is no incentive to deviate as fi(s) ≥ δE [fi(s′)].
Finally, for k /∈ R(s), the rules are such that no action is taken and thus
there no possibility for deviation. Similarly, if v(s) > δE
[∑
j∈R(s) fj(s
′)
]
given decision rules by responders, proposer i cannot beneﬁt from deviating
to a proposal that is accepted with positive probability. Finally, if v(s) =
δE
[∑
j∈R(s) fj(s
′)
]
the strategy proﬁle instructs the proposer to make an
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acceptable proposal with positive probability φ(s) such that for excluded
players k φ(s) · E [fk(s′)] = fk(s) as required.
Equilibrium Existence
We prove existence of equilibrium by showing the existence of a ﬁxed point
of the correspondence A. The argument is standard and makes use of Kaku-
tani's ﬁxed point theorem.
Proof. A is a self mapping on the space of payoﬀs which is a subspace X ⊆
Rn·|S|. X is non-empty, closed, bounded and convex. Boundedness can be
seen by recognizing that the maximum payoﬀ of any player in any state is
the maximum valuation across all states.
Now, A is single valued for most of its domain. It is set valued for
excluded players where payoﬀs for active players are equal for agreement
and delay. In those instances the correspondence maps into a closed interval
which implies that the correspondence is convex. Finally end-points of the
interval are such that A has a closed graph.
Then by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem A() has a ﬁxed point.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We proof by contradiction. Assume ∃ s˜ s.t. v(s˜) > δv∗ so that delay is not
eﬃcient and no agreement is struck. Then by Proposition 1:
v(s˜) ≤ δ
∑
i∈R(s˜)
E
[
fi(s
′)
]
As v∗ refers to the total expected payoﬀ and thus the maximum that all
players can jointly achieve, we have:∑
i∈R(s˜)
E
[
fi(s
′)
]
≤
∑
i∈N)
E
[
fi(s
′)
]
≤v∗
Combining these terms we get:
v(s˜) ≤ δ
∑
j∈R(s˜)
E
[
fj(s
′)
]
≤ δv∗
where the ﬁnal step establishes the contradiction.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider ﬁrst payoﬀs of essential players as δ → 1. Let i be essential, then
by Proposition 1, for states s in which i is responding, fi(s) → E [fi(s′)].
Adding across states and noting that by being essential i is either proposing
or responding, this implies equalization of payoﬀs across states, i.e. fi(s˜)→
E [fi(s
′)] for states s˜ in which i is proposing.
Now consider a non-essential player k involved in two states s and s˜ which
share the same route such that R(s) = R(s˜) = R and k ∈ R. Furthermore,
let k = κ(s) and i = κ(s˜) with i essential. Then as δ → 1, payoﬀs for i
tend to the same amount across s and s˜. All other responding players will
receive equal payoﬀ on the route by Proposition 1. This implies that also for
k payoﬀs will be equal, i.e. fk(s)→ E [fk(s′)] and fk(s˜)→ E [fk(s′)].
Finally, by Proposition 1 fk(s) = 0 for s in which k is excluded. As
such states arrive with positive probability, we deduce E [fk(s
′)] = 0 as
required.
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